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Contractual Controls of Damages
In Commercial Transactions
By JAMES B. SMrrH*
Parties to contracts undertake to control damages for three general
reasons. They undertake to control damages if, because of their uncer-
tain or speculative nature, they will be difficult to prove. They under-
take to control damages because they foresee that, while they will be
provable, they will, when awarded, pose a problem in collection. They
undertake to control damages because they will be liable for them and
because the law will, to some extent, allow them to contract away such
liability. The first control is liquidated damages. The second control
does not have a label so that of forfeiture clause is given it for the pur-
poses of this article. The third control is mainly the exculpatory clause.
These various devices will be the subject matter of this article. They
will be discussed in the order in which they have been introduced.
They will be discussed from the standpoint of the California law and
lawyer. To make it something of a working tool for him, considerable
attention will be given to problems of drafting.
This much more may be said by way of introduction. Parties have
a free hand in the substantive areas of contract. They may, for example,
write their own ticket on consideration, subject only to equitable lim-
itations. This is the policy of freedom of contract. The remedial area,
on the other hand, is the province of the courts. It is their function to
fix and enforce damages. Parties can play but a small role here. The
only case in which they are given power to fix damages is where it
would be difficult for the courts to do so, in which case they may liqui-
date damages. To an extent as yet undefined, they have power to limit
damages for breach of contract.
Parties have always sought to enlarge their role in the matter of
fixing damages. Since they do have power in the substantive areas of
contract and since they can, in a proper case, liquidate damages, it is
not surprising to find their attempts in this direction camouflaged in
the garb of the areas in which they may act. Thus the seller calls his
forfeiture clause "liquidated damages" or makes the forfeiture "con-
sideration for execution" of the contract. The net result has been that
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate College School of Law. The writer wishes to
acknowledge the valuable assistance given by William A. O'Malley and Harold B. Reeve
of Golden Gate College School of Law.
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efforts of parties to secure themselves against the difficulty of collecting
damages have uniformly evolved as pseudo-liquidated damages clauses
or as "consideration" clauses, sometimes pseudo, sometimes not. The
end problem with respect to all of these, except the true "considera-
tion" clause, is whether enforcement would work a forfeiture; hence




In California liquidated damages are permitted if, at the time of
contracting, it appears that it will be impracticable or extremely dif-
ficult to fix actual damages.' It is the "look forward" that counts. 2
The Restatement of Contracts requires a backward look as well, that
is, requires difficulty to appear at the time of contracting and to exist
in fact at time of breach.3 Under the California rule it would be im-
material that the difficulty had become removed as of the time of
breach.4 It is also the rule in California that recovery is not barred by
the fact that there has been no actual damage." This should go on a
different ground however, although the California courts have not
1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671: "The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an
amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of damages sustained by a breach
thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be impracticable or extremely dif-
ficult to fix the actual damage." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1670: 'Every contract by which the
amount of damage to be paid, or other compensation to be made, for a breach of an
obligation, is determined in anticipation thereof, is to that extent void, except as provided
in (1671)." Case law supplies the fact that it is as of the time of contracting that diffi-
culty must appear. Atkinson v. Pac. Fire Extinguisher Co., 40 Cal. 2d 192, 253 P.2d 18
(1953); Better Food Markets v. Amer. Dist. Teleg. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 253 P.2d 10
(1953); Hanlon Drydock Co. v. McNear, 70 Cal. App. 204, 210-211, 232 Pac. 1002
(1954) (to say otherwise would be to write into 1671, "provided such impossibility




RESTATEMENT, CONTACTS § 339, Comment e.
4 Hanlon Drydock Co. v. McNear, supra note 1.
5 McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956), where the court said at
586: "We hold that in order to recover on a contract provision for liquidated damages
the plaintiff must plead and prove that at the time the contract was entered into damages
in the event of a breach would be impracticable or extremely difficult of ascertainment;
that the sum agreed upon represented a reasonable endeavor to ascertain what such
damages would be; and that a breach of the contract had occurred. In other words, no
actual damage is necessary in order to recover under a liquidated damages provision pro-
vided that the case is, in other respects, a proper one under the conditions set forth in
section 1671 of the Civil Code." Cf. RESTATENrT, CONTRACTS § 339, Comment e. Prior
California cases to the contrary were expressly disapproved in McCarthy. One of these is
Kelly v. McDonald, 98 Cal. App. 121, 276 Pac. 404 (1929), where the theory was that
the word "damages" requires some damage in fact.
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declared the ground, only the result.6 It should go on the ground that
a liquidation of damages is, conceptually, a conclusive determination
of the consequences of a breach, binding at all events.7 For the same
reason, it should not be possible to disregard liquidated damages and
seek actual damages where it appears that the latter will be greater;
again, a result reached by the California courts.8 On the other hand,
if the liquidated damages clause is invalid so that there has not been
an effective determination of damages, actual damages ought to be re-
coverable, and it is so held in California.9
Only compensatory damages are allowed for breach of contract.10
Therefore liquidated damages must be compensatory in design." The
California courts have said this in various ways, the formula depending
on the extent to which the given type of case permits estimation of
actual damages. It has been said that liquidated damages must repre-
sent a reasonable endeavor to estimate actual damages,'12 that they
must bear a reasonable relation to probable damages, 13 that they must
represent a reasonable endeavor to fix fair compensation. 14 Where nec-
essary, it has been added that the greater the difficulty of estimating,
the rougher the estimate that ought to be accepted.' 5 Whatever the
formula, the purpose is to require observance of the principle of com-
pensation. Of necessity, the real test is often the negative one that the
amount agreed upon does not appear to be punitive.' 6
There is a third "requirement" for liquidated damages, mentioned
previously, which has received little attention. Conceptually, a liqui-
dation of damages is an agreement which is intended to and does con-
clude the damage consequences of breach. 17 If it were necessary to
use it, this would be ground for finding that provisions designed to
secure performance and to provide security against nonperformance
(forfeiture clauses) are not liquidated damages. A liquidation of dam-
ages being a determination of the damage consequences of breach,
6 McCarthy v. Tally, supra note 5.
7 See Cowan v. Meyer, 125 Md. 450, 94 Atl. 18, 21-22, 34 A.L.R. 1336, 1341-1342
(1915).
8 Hanlon Drydock Co. v. MeNear, supra note 1.
9 Ramsay v. Rodgers, 60 Cal. App. 781, 784, 214 Pac. 261 (1923).
10 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294.
11 Notes 12-14 infra.
12 McCarthy v. Tally, supra note 5.
13 Better Food Markets v. Amer. Dist. Teleg. Co., supra note 1, at 187; Atkinson v.
Pac. Fire Extinguisher Co., supra note 1, at 197.
14 Better Food Markets v. Amer. Dist. Teleg. Co., supra note 1, at 187; Atkinson v.
Pac. Fire Extinguisher Co., supra note 1, at 196.
15 Better Food Markets v. Amer. Dist. Teleg. Co., supra note 1.
16 See Shafer v. Sloan, 3 Cal. App. 335, 85 Pac. 162 (1906).
17 Cowan v. Meyer, supra note 7. See Hanlon Drydock Co. v. McNear, supra note 1.
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recovery of the agreed damages ought to be the sole damages remedy
of the injured party.18 This being so, provisions making it "optional"
to take a sum as liquidated damages, a common drafting technique,
ought to be defective. In undertaking to give an option between agreed
damages and actual damages, they would be undertaking to do some-
thing which is antithetical to the concept of liquidation of damages.
While attack on this ground has not been made, it could, if made, prove
to be a ground for invalidating an otherwise valid liquidated damages
provision.
Case Law
Requirements for and basic principles of liquidated damages have
been reviewed. To see when actual damages would be impracticable
or extremely difficult to fix, and when they would not, and to see some
of the workings of the compensation requirement, the cases must be
examined. While it begs the question, it is damages which are specu-
lative, which a party cannot prove satisfactorily and which a court
cannot determine satisfactorily, which bring a case within Civil Code
section 1671. Lost profits and injuries to good will are the chief ex-
amples of this and hence, with one exception (the detection service
cases infra), are the types of damages found in those cases in which
liquidated damages clauses have been upheld. It has been said quite
aptly and perhaps more graphically that a case comes within 1671
when damages are "inherently uncertain."19 Ironically this was said
in the one group of cases that is doubtful, the detection service cases.
20
The various types of cases in which liquidated damages have been at-
tempted will now be examined. Also to be discussed in this section is
the matter of limiting damages for breach of contract, as distinguished
from liquidating damages, which ties in with the detection service
cases, discussed infra.
Covenants Not to Compete
Breach of covenant not to compete is thought to be the clearest
case for Civil Code section 1671. It is said that the damages from such
breach "'are so absolutely uncertain that courts have recognized the
fullest liberty of parties to fix beforehand [their] amount...,.,"21 The
case is so clear, it is added, that the requirements of pleading and proof
of damage-fixing difficulty are dispensed with,22 but this seems equally
18 Ibid. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3389 permits specific performance despite liquidated
damages.
19 Better Food Markets v. Amer. Dist. Teleg. Co., supra note 1, at 188.
2
0 Discussed pp. 128-129, infra.
2 1 Potter v. Ahrens, 110 Cal. 674, 681, 43 Pac. 388 (1896).
22 Shafer v. Sloan, 3 Cal. App. 335, 338, 85 Pac. 162 (1906).
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true in other well defined cases. 23 Only two California cases are found
in which the amount agreed upon as damages is shown.24 In both, dam-
ages were of a lump sum variety. This is bad because failure to take
into consideration the duration of the breach is failure to exercise re-
gard for the principle of compensation. 25 Damages should be at a
monthly rate for the term of the breach. Nevertheless, recovery was
permitted in the California cases presumably for the reason that the
amount agreed upon was not punitive.
26
Delay in Performance
Delay in performance of a contract may give rise to damages such
as lost profits which are not capable of being proved, in which case
liquidated damages are in order.27 The proper provision sets damages
at a daily rate for the term of the breach.28
Collateral problems arise. Are liquidated damages recoverable if
the contractor abandons the job? It has been held that the liquidated
damages clause does not apply in such event.29 Suppose, after the con-
tractor abandons the job, the injured party decides not to complete it.
Since injury will result from nonperformance rather than from delay
in performance, actual rather than liquidated damages ought to be the
recovery. No cases are found.
Some Areas in Which Not Attempted
It may be noted at this point that, for one reason or another, liqui-
dated damages are not included in some kinds of contracts that would
support them. One is the entertainer's contract which always calls for
23 See 2 WlTrNr, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, 1464-1465.
24 Potter v. Ahrens, supra note 21 (exotic foods business sold for $3,000; $3,000
damages for breach of covenant); Franz v. Bieler 126 Cal. 176, 56 Pac. 249, 58 Pac.
466 (1899) (liquor business; sales price not shown; $2,000 damages).
25 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 1071, p. 336.
26 Shafer v. Sloan, supra note 22.
27 Hanlon Drydock Co. v. McNear, supra note 1 (reconditioning oil tanker; dam-
ages $400 per day of delay); Consolidated Lumber Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.
App. 698, 166 Pac. 385 (1917) ($50 per day of delay in delivery of lumber). See gen-
erally Annots., 10 A.L.R. 2d 789, 42 A.L.R. 2d 1123.
28 Supra note 25.
29 Sinnott v. Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 46, 187 Pac. 105 (1919). Cf. Six Companies
of Calif. v. Joint Highway District, 110 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1940), rev'd 311 U.S. 180
(1940) (for failure to follow Sinnott case). It may be noted that in the Six Companies
case, the owner was seeking to enforce the liquidated damages provision, while in the
Sinnott case the contractor was attempting to use it to limit damages which would often
be the purpose of such clauses from a contractor's standpoint. See generally re abandon-
ment of the job by the contractor, 5 CoRBn, CONTRACrS, § 1072. No California case is
found which has been concerned with the use by a contractor of a "liquidated damages"
clause to limit liability. There are of course the detection service cases and the Wheeler
case, discussed pp. 128-129, infra. See generally 5 ComIN, CONTRACTS, § 1086.
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arbitration of a breach on the part of the entertainer. The employer is
reimbursed for reservations cancelled and for expenses incurred in pre-
paring for and publicizing the engagement. In many cases the bar-
gaining position of one party is such as to make it impolitic to broach
the subject of breach and its consequences. The man who has worked
hard to obtain a valuable distributorship will not want to jeopardize
it in this manner, though he will stand to suffer incalculable damage
if the manufacturer breaches the contract.
Co-op Agreements
It is thought that incalculable damage will result from breach of
an agreement to market crops through a non-profit agricultural coop-
erative association and that therefore liquidated damages are proper.30
The reasoning is that at the very least prestige will be lost if it be-
comes known that the association cannot control its members.3 ' It
may be noted that in this instance a party is permitted to unite calcu-
lable damages (the profit to be realized by the association from the
sale of the crop) with incalculable damages (the damages resulting
from loss of prestige) and to recover liquidated damages for the whole.
Somewhat to be compared is the rule that there is not due regard
for the principle of compensation if the same rate of damages is set
for breaches of different gravity.3 2 This rule receives recognition in a
late cooperative association case.33 The liquidated damages clause,
which provided a single, flat rate of damages, was declared to be ap-
plicable if "grower fails to deliver [raisins] in accordance with the
terms [of this contract]." A term of the contract was that raisins were
to be delivered in "properly cured" condition. Those in question were
not, and it was claimed that the liquidated damages clause applied to
a breach of this type as well as to sales outside the association. The
court refused to apply it, reasoning in effect that while the liquidated
damages clause would operate compensatorily in cases of sales outside
the association, it would not in cases involving departure from the re-
quired standard of curing; that in those cases it would operate puni-
tively if the departure was either slight or great; that therefore it was
S0 Anaheim Citrus Fruit Ass'n v. Yeoman, 51 Cal. App. 759, 763, 197 Pac. 959
(1921). CAL. AGmc. C. § 1209 codifies the rule of these cases. See further Olson v. Biola
Coop. Raisin Growers Ass'n, 33 Cal. 2d 664, 204 P.2d 10 (1949). Compare with Sun
Maid Raisin Growers v. Mosesian, 90 Cal. App. 1, 265 Pac. 936 (1923), and Anaheim
Citrus Fruit Ass'n v. Yeoman, supra.
31 Ibid.
32 See generally RESTATmNT, CoNTRACTs, §339, Comment b; 5 CoRBIN, CON-
TRAcrs, § 1066. See Fox Chicago R. Corp. v. Zukor's, 50 Cal. App. 2d 129, 122 P.2d
705 (1942).
3
1 Olson v. Biola Coop. Raisin Growers Ass'n, 33 Cal. 2d 664, 674; 204 P.2d 10
(1949).
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to be presumed that the parties did not intend it to apply to a breach
of the type in question.
Detection Service Cases; Liquidation v. Limitation
The most recent developments of note in the field of liquidated
damages proper are in the detection service cases of 1953, a duo of
cases of first impression involving burglar and fire detection systems
which failed to function.34 Plaintiffs lost a large sum of money to a
burglar and a mill to a fire. In each case a standard form contract
contained a provision of which this may be taken to be representative:
"It is agreed. . . that the Lessor is not an insurer, that payments here-
inbefore named are based solely on the value of the services in the
operation of the system described, and in case of failure to perform
such services and a resulting loss, its liability hereunder shall be limited
to and fixed at the sum of twenty-five dollars as liquidated damages,
and not as a penalty, and this liability shall be exclusive." 35 It was held
that this was a liquidated damages clause, that the case was a proper
one for such damages, and that defendants were required to pay only
the amounts stipulated by the contracts (fifty dollars in the burglar
alarm contract).
The obvious objection is that this is limitation of liability rather
than liquidation of damages, although a case can be made for the
latter, as the court proved.
Difficulty of fixing actual damages is made to lie in the fact that,
at the time of contracting, it would be difficult to predict the amount
of damage for which defendant would become liable in the event of
breach, this because of the wide range of possibilities and because of
the possibility of a problem in causation. Heretofore the damage-fixing
difficulty has been thought to require difficulty of determination at
time of breach, not merely until that time, which is what the first part
of the court's new found basis for qualifying under Civil Code section
1671 would substitute. The causation problem smacks strongly of ex-
pediency. It is a possibility but a rather remote one, and it can be said
that 1671 requires at least probability of difficulty. Moreover, though
this may be semantic here, it is a problem in cause of loss, not loss.
34 Better Food Markets v. Amer. Dist. Teleg. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179,253 P.2d 10 (1953);
Atkinson v. Pac. Fire Extinguisher Co., 40 Cal. 2d 192, 253 P.2d 18 (1953). See Com-
ment, STAN. L. REV. 822 (1953) for critical review.
35 Atkinson v. Pac. Fire Extinguisher Co., supra note 34 at 194. The clause in the
Better Food Markets case, supra note 34, was more nearly a liquidated damages clause in
that it added a recital that actual damages would be impracticable and extremely diffi-
cult to fix.
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To find that a stock figure in a stock contract represented a rea-
sonable endeavor to fix fair compensation, the court had seriously to
debase the compensation requirement. In the final analysis it could
say only that "the parties agreed to the liquidation provisions, and
there is no evidence that they were not fully aware of circumstances
making it desirable that liquidated damages be provided for."36
The real trouble is that there are present all of the reasons for which
liability is limited, few, if any, of those for which damages are liqui-
dated, except as one accepts those given by the court. A party calls for
liquidated damages when he will have difficulty proving actual dam-
ages. The party to receive them is the party who asks them and for
whose benefit they are included. None of these things is true here. A
party limits liability especially when he is exceptionally vulnerable to
liability or is vulnerable to exceptional liability. Defendants are both.
Defendants, at whose instance and for whose benefit the clause is in-
cluded, are not concerned about the difficulty of proving damages but
of escaping them. It perhaps sums up the situation to say that the
cases are ones in which it is more difficult to find fault with the rea-
soning than with the result.
Limitation of liability for breach of contract was an open subject
in this state at the time of these decisions. Perhaps the court did not
want to get into that area. Limitation of liability is capable of being
introduced into any kind of contract while liquidated damages are
narrowly confined.
Assuming that liability could be limited in such a case, the outcome
would be the same under either theory. So far as the injured party is
concerned, the only difference between liquidated damages and limita-
tion of liability is that in the case of the latter damages must be proved
up to the amount of the limitation.
Subsequently to the detection service cases, it was stated unquali-
fiedly by a California district court of appeal in Wheeler v. Open-
heimer37 that one may limit his liability for damages for breach of
contract. The court adopted the rule of the Restatement of Contracts
that "an agreement limiting the amount of damages recoverable for
breach is not an agreement to pay either liquidated damages or a pen-
alty. Except in the case of certain public service contracts, the con-
tracting parties can by agreement limit their liability in damages to a
specified amount, either at the time of making their principal contract,
or subsequently thereto."38 Involved was a contract for the sale of real
36 Better Food Markets v. American Dist. Teleg. Co., supra note 34, at 187.
37 140 Cal. App. 2d 497, 295 P.2d 128 (1956).
ss RFsTATEmENT, CoNTRAcrs § 339, Comment g.
Nov., 1960]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
estate which provided that, in the event of breach, the seller was to be
liable only for expenses incurred by the buyer, which was held to limit
the seller's liability to such amount.
This was the first and to date is the only decision that has dealt
squarely with the matter. 39 Assuming that it becomes the settled Cali-
fornia law, that law seems to become this, which leaves one with the
feeling that all is not well: Breach of contract duty may result from
negligence, as it did in the detection service cases. In one of those cases,
where plaintiff combined a count for negligence with one for breach of
contract, it was argued that the liquidated damages clause could not
control the cause of action for negligence since such damages lie only
for breach of contract. The court said that while breach of duty may
result from negligence, yet if the duty exists only by virtue of contract,
then contract principles control to the extent that the liquidated dam-
ages clause fixes the remedy. 40 Now, however, if one attempts to ex-
empt himself from liability for negligence, he will meet with great
resistance on the part of the courts. They will construe his exemption
clause strictly because they are loath to permit one to escape liability
for negligence. 41
In the middle ground where breach of contract duty results from
negligence, one would, under the Wheeler case, be able, without dif-
ficulty, to escape liability for negligence by limiting his liability for
damages. This is what is felt to be wrong with the picture. One may do
freely in an indirect manner what he is put at great pain to do directly.
Negligence, and escape therefrom, is as reprehensible if it results in
breach of contract as it is if it results in tort.
The problem is probably more academic than real since there are
probably not many cases in which the duty, negligently breached,
exists only by virtue of contract. There being no negligence involved,
the rule of the Wheeler case is not objectionable. If I want to sell you
property but with the right to withdraw upon compensating you for
expenses incurred, and you are willing to make this deal, nothing im-
moral is involved. You went into the matter with your eyes open and
have no complaint. No one forced you to make the deal. This is the
doctrine of freedom of contract justifiably adhered to. If I elect not
to complete the transaction, it seems doubtful in this case at least that
there is a "breach." Breach of contract is wrongful conduct.42 I have
39 The court cites a long list of cases which are supposed to support its position. All
but perhaps one are distinguishable as cases involving public services whose limitations
of liability have the sanction of some official body such as the Public Utilities Commission.
40 Better Food Markets v. Amer. Dist. Teleg. Co., supra note 34, at 187-188.
41 This is covered in the section on exculpatory clauses, infra, p. 140.
42 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 312, Comment a.
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done only what I have contracted for a right to do.
Contracts Where Liquidation Unavailable
There are three important kinds of contracts in which liquidated
damages have been attempted and have been found wanting in the
requisite difficulty of fixing actual damages.
1. Leases
They have been tried, though not very seriously, in leases.43 The
ordinary breach of lease is rent default. Actual damages are unpaid
rents which present difficulty only of collection. Landlords protect
themselves against this by rent deposits and by the prepaid rent and
bonus devices which rely upon a "consideration" theory. These will be
discussed further in the section on forfeiture clauses. It would seem that
liquidated damages would be proper for breach of a percentage rental
lease or, more accurately, for breach of the covenant to continue busi-
ness contained in such lease. The damages to the lessor therefrom
would be difficult to prove in the same manner as lost profits. No cases
are found on this. Where a business is leased, that is, a hotel or mo-
tel which will be operated by the lessee, abandonment by the lessee
may result in damage to good will, for which liquidated damages are
proper.4
4
2. Sales of Goods
It has been attempted to make the buyer of goods liable for liqui-
dated damages in case of breach. The statute specifies the measure of
damages for such breach to be the difference between the contract
price and market value of the goods at the time of breach.45 To re-
cover liquidated damages the goods would have to be without a market
value.40 This possibility is extremely remote in view of California de-
cisions to the effect that market value does not require a well defined
price 4 7 and that it will suffice that the goods are a common subject of
43Redman v. Graham, 211 Cal. 491, 295 Pac. 1031 (1931); Jack v. Sinsheimer,
125 Cal. 563, 58 Pac. 130 (1899). See McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981
(1956). See further Ricker v. Rombough, 120 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 912, 261 P.2d 328
(1953) (acceleration clause, penalty). Note CAL. Crv. CODE § 3308.
44McCarthy v. Tally, supra note 43 (hotel; $10,000 liquidated damages).
45 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1784(3).
4 Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal. 2d 382, 115 P.2d 498 (1941); Stark v. Shemada, 187
Cal. 785,204 Pac. 214 (1922); Pac. Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110, 27 Pac. 36 (1891).
See further Thomas v. Anthony, 30 Cal. App. 217, 157 Pac. 823 (1916) (deposit may
not be forfeited as liquidated damages).
47 Ibid.
Nov., 1960]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
trade.48 No case is to be found in which recovery of liquidated dam-
ages for a breach of the type in question has been permitted.
3. Real Estate Contracts
The real estate contract (deposit receipt and land contract 4 9 ) is
the main spawning ground of the forfeiture clause labelled "liquidated
damages," which is designed to secure performance and which calls
for forfeiture of the buyer's deposit or equity if he fails to complete
the contract. Oddly, but not really so odd, the California courts have
never been required to face up to the question of whether liquidated
damages are proper for breach of a contract to buy realty. The reason
is because the battle, so to speak, has been waged at another level thus
far. During the first fifty years of the century, the Glock era,5" such
clauses enjoyed good standing as forfeiture clauses. When the Barkis-
Freedman cases 51 of the last decade ended the Glock era, they did so
by striking down such clauses as forfeiture clauses on equitable prin-
ciples. Thus the cases have never gotten down to the basic question.
If liquidated damages are possible there are, in any event, two im-
portant limitations.52 First, as in the sale of goods, there is a statutory
measure of damages, the difference between contract price and market
value, 53 such that market value would have to be unascertainable or
other special, incalculable damage would have to be in sight (e.g.,
seller would lose a purchase which is to be completed with the pro-
ceeds of this transaction). Secondly, in the Freedman case, 54 the court
took a "backward look" in this area. There the seller, after assuming the
buyer's deposit was forfeited, resold the property at a profit so as not to
suffer actual damage. 55 The buyer sued to recover the deposit. One
argument of the seller was that the forfeiture could be treated as liqui-
dated damages. The court decided that even if it could, actual damages
were not impracticable or extremely difficult to fix because of the resale
48 Stark v. Shemada, supra note 46 (used hotel furnishings).
49 "Land contract" is used herein to describe the contract for the conditional sale of
real estate, variously called land contract, agreement of sale (by the California Real
Estate Association in its form), contract of sale, etc.
50 Glock v. Howard & Wilson Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898).
51 Freedman v. Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951); Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal.
2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
2 See as indicating liquidated damages may never be proper, Drew v. Pedlar, 87
Cal. 443, 25 Pac. 749 (1891). Contra, Wright v. Rodgers, 198 Cal. 137, 243 Pac. 866
(1926); Rocks v. Hamburger, 89 Cal. App. 2d 194, 200 P.2d 92 (1948); Wolfe v. Heller
86 Cal. App. 2d 696, 195 P.2d 36 (1948).
53 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3307.
54 Freedman v. Rector, supra note 51, at 23.
55 The seller did suffer damages to the extent of broker's and escrow fees incurred
in connection with the transaction, which he was permitted to retain out of the deposit.
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at profit. If the backward look is permissible here, as this indicates, then
actual damages are in issue in every case and, where provable, are con-
trolling and render liquidated damages nugatory.
Drafting, Pleading and Proof
In deference to Civil Code section 1671, the courts say that plaintiff
must plead and prove difficulty of fixing actual damages.56 Exception
is made for the clear case, breach of a covenant not to complete being
so designated. 57 None of this has proved of importance, however, since
the cases have either been clearly within or clearly without 1671 so
that they have not really turned on proof, and certainly not on plead-
ing. In the decided cases, pleading in general terms has been suffi-
cient.58 (E.g., "At all times mentioned herein it was, and now is,
impracticable and extremely difficult to fix the amount of damage
suffered, or to be suffered, by plaintiff in the event of the failure of
defendant to comply with the terms and conditions of paragraph --
of said contract.") Compliance with the principle of compensation is
a matter of proof but not of pleading.59
Despite the fact that the requirements of pleading and proof are
not adhered to strictly, the attorney for the party to receive liquidated
damages must be prepared to meet them. Since it is the vital time,
preparation must be made at the time of contracting. If the case
promises to be a marginal one, the attorney should establish fairly
elaborately why it is a proper one for liquidated damages, either by a
pre-contract memorandum, made part of the contract, or by recitals in
the contract.
General Terms Usually Sufficient
In the ordinary case, however, a liquidated damages clause in gen-
eral terms will be sufficient. For obvious reasons, language of "forfei-
ture" or "penalty" should not be used in such a clause, except perhaps
in denial of penalty ("as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty")
as is commonly done. While not fatal, such language does not help.60
Also language of "option," which belies a true liquidation of damages,
should be avoided. This would be a broad form of liquidated damages
clause which follows the statutory language:
o The parties agree that it would be impracticable or extremely diffi-
cult to fix the actual damages, if any, that may result from a failure
56 Supra note 23.
57 Shafer v. Sloan, supra note 22.
58 Supra note 23.
59 Supra notes 12-14.
8 0 Hanlon Drydock Co. v. McNear, supra note 1, at 214.
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on the part of first party to perform the terms and conditions of para-
graph -- hereof; therefore the parties agree that in the event first
party shall fail to perform said terms and conditions, first party shall
pay to second party the sum of $-- as and for liquidated damages
for such breach of this contract, which damages shall be the sole
damages remedy of second party for such breach.
As has been seen, liquidated damages should take into considera-
tion the duration of the breach where it will be of a continuing nature.
This would be a form of clause for delay in performance which does so:
o The parties agree that it would be impracticable or extremely dif-
ficult to fix the actual damages, if any, that may result from a failure
on the part of first party to complete the work contemplated by this
contract within the time set for its completion, as set forth herein-
above; therefore the parties agree that for each and every day said
work remains uncompleted beyond the said time set for its comple-
tion, first party shall pay to second party the sum of $-- as and
for liquidated damages, which damages shall be the sole damages
remedy of second party for such delay in performance.
The attorney for a party providing services of a kind which would
bring him within the principles of the detection service cases would
do well to use the form of clause approved there. 61
If a variety of breaches is to be covered by liquidated damages,
which is rather unlikely, the damages will have to be tailored to the
breach in such manner as to insure compliance with the principle of
compensation.
If, arguendo, liquidated damages are permissible for breach of a
contract to buy realty, then the deposit receipt should be specially
drafted to show the reasons why actual damages would be difficult to
ascertain; it should be shown that the amount of the deposit has been
set not with reference to the buyer's ability and willingness to pay, as is
usual, but with an eye to establishing fair compensation for breach;
and retention of the deposit should be made the sole damages remedy
of the seller.
II. Forfeiture Clauses
Equity has had its own way of dealing with provisions which at-
tempt to protect a party against damages but which, if enforced, would
inflict a penalty or work a forfeiture. It is with these equity rules that
this section is concerned.
Two anti-forfeiture policies which have been reduced to statute will
be important here. Civil Code section 3275, the general anti-forfeiture
61 Supra note 35.
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statute, says: "Vhenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto
incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of
his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom,
upon making full compensation to the other party, except in case of
a grossly negligent, wilful, or fraudulent breach of duty." Section
3369 (1) provides: "Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted
to enforce a penalty or forfeiture. .. "
The important anti-forfeiture law begins with Barkis v. Scott 6 2 in
1949 and consists of that case, Freedman v. Rector,63 and a few later
cases which extend upon the principles of those cases. Prior to the
Barkis case was the Glock era which is familiar to all and will not be
rehashed. 4
Barkds and Reformulation
Barkis v. Scott,65 with its compelling fact situation, provided an
ideal opportunity to commence reformulation of the California law.
Involved were land contract buyers of a modest home who had made
payments faithfully for many years and who just once slipped, who
had spent over 3,000 dollars on improvements, whose one slip was
rendered blameless by circumstances of illness, and who had acted
promptly to cure default but not as promptly as the seller had to de-
clare forfeiture. Despite a time-essence provision (the bugaboo of the
Glock case), it was clear, said the court, that the buyers were entitled
to relief under Civil Code section 3275 66 and that the relief dictated
by the circumstances was reinstatement to the contract upon payment
of delinquencies. To be noted for future reference is reasoning of the
court that, where feasible, specific performance (here reinstatement)
is the preferable relief since it avoids the difficulty of proving the
seller's damages presented by the alternative, restitution.6 7
While the Barkis case decided no more than that a defaulting buyer
whose default was not serious and who had substantially performed
ought to be reinstated to his contract to save him from harsh forfeiture,
it created a spark to light a fire.
Baffa v. Johnson,6 8 in 1950, became a bridge to the Freedman case.
Buyer deposited 5,000 dollars in escrow on a purchase price of 93,000
6234 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
6337 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1949).
64 For the history of the law in this area see 18 CALIF. L. R1v. 681; 27 CALF. L.
REv. 583 (1939); 37 CAIF. L. REv. 704 (1949); 23 So. CAL. L. REv. 110 (1949); 2
STANr. L. REv. 235 (1949); 40 CALF. L. REv. 593 (1952).
65 Supra note 67.
6 See discussion supra.
67 Barlis v. Scott, supra note 62, at 122.
6835 Cal. 2d 36, 216 P.2d 13 (1950)..
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dollars, then failed to complete the escrow. The deposit was forfeited,
and the buyer sued to recover it. Having wilfully defaulted, he was
not entitled to relief under Civil Code section 3275. He made this argu-
ment however: Civil Code section 3369(1)69 provides an alternative
basis for relief. It prevents the seller from quieting title without re-
funding to the buyer the excess of moneys paid over damages (the
reciprocal of section 3369 (1) ). A buyer ought to be able to sue affirma-
tively to obtain the same relief. Since the seller's damages in this case
are the difference between contract price and value of the property at
the time of breach, the buyer ought to be able to recover the amount
by which his deposit exceeds such damages. The court, while receptive
to the idea, was unable to adopt it because plaintiff had failed to show
that the value of the property was more than 88,000 dollars at time
of breach.
Freedman and Wilful Breach
The next year was obliging enough to bring Freedman v. Rector 70
in which the buyer wilfully defaulted after making a 2,000 dollar de-
posit. The seller forfeited the deposit, then resold at a profit so as to
suffer no damage in the original transaction except broker's and escrow
fees. The buyer sued to recover the deposit. This, said the court, makes
it "necessary to consider the question left open in the Baffa case,
namely, whether a vendee under such circumstances (wilful breach)
may recover the excess of his part payment over the damage he caused
the vendor." It then proceeded to adopt the theorem of plaintiff in the
Baffa case, permitting the buyer to recover his deposit less the broker's
and escrow fees paid by the seller. It pointed out for good measure
that the law does not permit punitive damages for breach of contract;
that there is no reason for departing from this merely because a party
has partly performed; and that in any event punishment should bear
a logical relationship to purpose, which it would not, where, as here,
it would become greater as the gravity of the breach diminished (the
longer payments made, the less culpable the breach, but the greater
the punishment).
Extensions of Barkis-Freedman Principles
Barkis gave the non-wilfully defaulting land contract buyer a right
of reinstatement. Freedman gave the wilfully defaulting deposit re-
69 Supra p. 135.
7o Supra note 63.
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ceipt buyer a right of restitution.71 Peterson v. Ridenour 
72 and Ward
v. Union Bond & Trust Co.73 extend these principles by giving a wil-
fully defaulting land contract buyer a right of redemption in a quiet
title action by the seller.
Questions Unanswered
Many questions remain to be answered:
0 Whether the California Supreme Court will approve the Peter-
son and Ward cases. While it has been argued that it should not, 4 it
seems likely that it will. A right of redemption has long been accorded
the non-wilfully defaulting buyer.75 Where possible, specific perform-
ance is the preferable relief according to Barkis. Wilfulness of breach
is not fatal according to Freedman. This adds up quite readily to a
right of redemption for the wilful defaulter. If a right of redemption is
recognized when the seller sues to quiet title, the buyer ought to have
an affirmative action for such relief based upon the Freedman case
theory that "the rights of the parties under identical fact situations
[should not] turn on the chance of which one first seeks the aid of the
COurt."76
e Whether the wilfully defaulting buyer on deposit receipt has a
right of redemption. There are no signposts here. It could be said that
restitution gives him as much as he deserves.
* Whether the wilfully defaulting land contract buyer has a right
of reinstatement as distinguished from a right of redemption. There is
some authority for this in Nelson v. Dangerfield.77 It has been said
that such right is accorded by the Peterson case but, so far as the report
discloses, the right given may be taken to be one of redemption.78
7' See Fleischer v. Cosgrove, 145 Cal. App. 2d 14, 301 P.2d 911 (1956); Major-
Blakeney Corp. v. Jenkins, 121 Cal. App. 2d 325, 263 P.2d 655 (1953) (taking buyer's
late tender to establish market value at time of breach).
72 135 Cal. App. 2d 720, 287 P.2d 848 (1955). See Nelson v. Dangerfield, 125 Cal.
App. 2d 146, 269 P.2d 953 (1954). Cf. Crofoot v. Weger, 109 Cal. App. 2d 839, 241
P.2d 1017 (1952).
73 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957).
74 10 STAN. L. REv. 355 (1958).
75 Gonzalez v. Hirose, 33 Cal. 2d 213, 200 P.2d 793 (1948).
76 Freedman v. Rector, supra note 63, at 22.
77 Supra note 72.
78 N. 7 in Ward v. Union Bond & Trust Co., 243 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1957),
says the Peterson case gave a right of reinstatement. From the writer's reading of the
Peterson case it appears that the buyer was buying the seller's equity subject to an
FHA-GI Loan, which the buyer was assuming; that full payment had been made for the
equity except for an amount of interest in dispute; that the buyer was called upon to pay
this, so that the right was actually one of redemption. While the court speaks of paying
"arrearaget," it has reference to the disputed interest.
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- Whether the wilfully defaulting land contract buyer has a right
of restitution. Bird v. Kenworthy 79 indicates that he can recover the
excess of payments over the reasonable rental value of the property
during his occupancy.
The answer to the foregoing questions may lie in large part in
Crofoot v. Weger 8 0 where it was said that wilful is not synonymous
with intentional, and that a buyer is not guilty of wilful breach of duty
which precludes relief under Civil Code section 3275 if his failure
to make payments is due to an honest but mistaken belief that he
has a defense.
Still these general questions remain:
1. Does the land contract remain a useful security device? The
land contract was conceived to avoid the expense and delay of enforc-
ing a deed of trust and the right of reinstatement given the trustor-land
buyer1 and it exists only for the right of forfeiture which it gives. If
against that right the buyer now has rights of reinstatement, redemp-
tion, and restitution, the seller is better off with a deed of trust.
2. Does the forfeiture (of deposit) provision in the deposit receipt
continue to serve a useful purpose? If the buyer abandons the deposit,
as he often does, the seller gets "damages" plus, in many cases, a wind-
fall. If the buyer is not willing to abandon it, it often becomes the basis
of a compromise, with part of it being returned to the buyer and the
seller retaining the balance in which case the seller again gets a satis-
factory benefit for his bargain. In any event it gives the seller security
for actual damages.
3. Is there a provision that would be more satisfactory? Mention
has been made of the "consideration" type of forfeiture clause. 82 It has
a counterpart in the field of leases, the so called lease "bonus," which
makes for an argument in its favor here. As has been pointed out, 3 a
landlord cannot obtain liquidated damages for rent default. To save
landlords from the damages that would result from breach of lease, the
prepaid rent and the bonus devices were conceived.
79 43 Cal. 2d 656, 277 P.2d 1 (1954).
80 Supra note 72.
81 For a comprehensive discussion of this matter and of the problems of the seller of
real estate whose buyer defaults, see Selected Problems in Real Estate Marketing and
Real and Personal Property Security Transactions (Univ. of Calif. School of Law and
Ext. Div. 1960).
82 The California Real Estate Association Standard Form Deposit Receipt provides
for retention of the deposit "as consideration for the execution of this agreement." The
California Real Estate Association Standard Form Agreement of Sale, which is its form
of land contract, provides for retention of payments made "as the consideration for mak-
ing this agreement."
83 Supra note 43.
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The first has the tenant pay, as absolute rent, double the usual
amount for the first months of the lease, no rent for a corresponding
number of the closing months. The bonus has the tenant pay some num-
ber of months' rent "as further consideration for this lease" or "as fur-
ther consideration for the execution of this lease"; again the tenant has
a corresponding number of the closing months rent free. These have
been upheld, that is, the defaulting tenant is not permitted to recover
the excess over actual damages where the landlord re-rents and the
amount of the prepaid rent or bonus exceeds actual damages.8 4 This
goes on the theory that the moneys have been paid presently and abso-
lutely, as consideration, for which parties are free to bargain as they
please.85 Can this be carried over to "consideration" type clauses in
deposit receipts? Certainly the court of the Barkis and Freedman cases
would not be prepared to yield to such a distinction. What it might
say is that while the lease bonus is money paid absolutely at the time
of formation of the contract, the deposit is not, but is money put up as
a security for the total purchase price, to become, to be sure, part
thereof when paid but to remain the property of the seller until that
time; that if the purchase price is not paid and the deposit forfeited,
it is taken as damages.86
This raises a reciprocal question. Is the lease bonus concept endan-
gered by the strong anti-forfeiture policy established by the Bark-is and
Freedman cases? Putting the question in terms of a fact situation,
suppose a tenant who has paid a 2,000 dollar bonus for a two year
84A-1 Garage v. Lange Inv. Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 593, 44 P.2d 681 (1935); Ramish
v. Workman, 33 Cal. App. 19, 164 Pac. 26 (1917). But the tenant may recover where
the landlord is responsible for termination of the tenancy: Butt v. Bertola, 110 Cal. App.
2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952) (wrongful eviction); Graham v. Wood, 8 Cal. App. 2d
451, 48 P.2d 124 (1935). And if the lease requires application of the bonus or prepaid
rent to the last months' rent so that it is really a security deposit, it will be treated as
such. Bacciocco v. Curtis, 12 Cal. 2d 109, 82 P.2d 385 (1938); Redman v. Graham, 211
Cal. 491, 295 Pac. 1031 (1931). The bonus and prepaid rent go on the theory that the
parties are dealing in the substantive area of contract. This theory permits other marginal
arrangements in leases:Vucinich v. Gordon, 51 Cal. App. 2d 434, 124 P.2d 868 (1942)
($500 month rent while holding over, as against $100 month during term of lease, en-
forceable; parties free to bargain as please); Kuhlemeier v. Lack, 50 Cal. App. 2d 802, 123
P.2d 918 (1942) (forfeiture of deposit in event of exercise of option to terminate lease
merely consideration for right to terminate).
8 5 This is an application of the freedom of contract theory or theory that parties
have a free hand in the substantive areas of contract. See note 84 supra.
86 See Rodriquez v. Barnett, 52 Cal. 2d 154, 338 P.2d 907 (1959), where the trans-
action failed because approval of a subdivision could not be obtained, and it was said
at 160 that "the mere recitation that the right of the seller to retain [the] deposit was
in consideration for executing [the] agreement, is insufficient to establish meaningful
separate consideration."
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lease defaults because of illness. The landlord immediately re-rents at
a higher rent so as to suffer no damage. Would today's equity permit
recovery of the bonus? Looking to substance,8 7 relief could be given
under Civil Code section 3275.88
The Barkis and Freedman principles have been extended to other
areas. Under them it has been held that there could not, without re-
gard to actual damages of the injured partners, be enforcement of a
provision in a partnership contract for forfeiture of a partner's interest
upon breach of the contract.
8 9
And, upon the principles of the Freedman case, it has been indi-
cated that a conditional buyer of personalty (a tractor) could, after
wilful breach, recover the amount by which his payments exceeded
the reasonable rental value of the property.90
This last is made questionable by the newly enacted Unruh Act,91
which spells out a right of redemption for a defaulting conditional
buyer 92 and which permits the seller to forfeit the buyer's equity if
such right is not exercised. 93 In view of this it would seem that there
would be equitable intervention, if at all, only in a case where there
were strong facts to mitigate default.
94
III. Exculpatory Clauses
We turn now to attempts of parties to exempt themselves from
liability by exculpatory clauses and by disclaimers of warranty.
87 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3528: "The law respects form less than substance."
ss See discussion p. 185, supra.
-9 Hill v. Hearron, 113 Cal. App. 2d 763, 249 P.2d 54 (1952).
90 Bird v. Kenworthy, 43 Cal. 2d 656, 277 P.2d 11 (1954). See Law v. Heiniger,
132 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 898, 282 P.2d 607 (1955).
91 CAL. CiV. CODE § 1801 et seq., effective January 1, 1960.
02 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.2 gives the buyer ten days to redeem after the seller re-
possesses and gives notice of intent to resell or to retain the goods in satisfaction of the
balance due, the seller being given an option in this regard. If the seller resells, CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1812.5 gives him limited right to a deficiency judgment. If the seller elects
to resell, the buyer, in addition to the ten day right of redemption, may redeem at any
time before sale. The Act speaks of redeeming by "paying or tendering the amount owing
under the contract" which sounds like a right of reinstatement, but the legislative com-
mittee report (Assembly Interim Comm. Rep., 1957-1959, Vol. 15, No. 22, p. 12) de-
scribes the Act as giving the buyer the "right to redeem . . . on payment or tender of
the balance owing," (emphasis added), indicating that the right is one of redemption
only.
93 Ibid.
94 The Act does not declare its remedies to be exclusive and there is nothing in the
legislative history to indicate such intent; therefore it would seem that in a proper case
a buyer could be given relief under the Barkis-Freedman line of cases.
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The California attorney has a bad record on exculpatory clauses;
he has consistently composed clauses that do not exculpate. There was
a time when there was an excuse for this, but that time has long since
passed. Yet, very recently, three cases of non-exculpating exculpatory
clauses have come downY5 To his credit the modem attorney has done
much to streamline legal instruments. With exculpatory clauses this
can be fatal. It has been said that they must be spelled out with "in-
finite clarity,"90 and this is very nearly the truth. If this portion of the
article does nothing else, it will have served a purpose if it drives home
that point.
This portion of the article will first discuss various general matters
about exculpatory clauses, including the basic problem in this area.
It will then review at considerable length the California case law in the
field of exculpatory clauses and in the field of disclaimers of warranty.
Finally, consideration will be given to the drafting of exculpatory
clauses.
A. General Considerations
As the term is used herein, an exculpatory clause is a provision by
which a party undertakes to exempt himself from liability for negli-
gence or negligent breach of duty, limit such liability to an agreed
amount, or shift such liability to another. (The last type, comprised of
indemnity or hold harmless clauses, is dealt with in a case study which
follows this article.
Exemption clauses include simple exemption clauses ("first party
shall not be liable for injury or damage to the person or property of
second party from any cause whatsoever"); waivers or releases ("sec-
ond party waives all claims against first party" or "releases first party
of all claims"); and covenants not to sue ("second party agrees not
to sue first party for any claim").
Attempts to limit liability to an agreed amount are generally con-
fined to the declared value clauses found in bills of lading, warehouse
receipts and the like. The ordinary practitioner is not concerned with
these, and it need be noted only that they have been upheld.
97
95 Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d... , 353 P.2d 924, 6
Cal. Rptr. 284, affirming 1 Cal. Rptr. 866 (D.C.A. Cal. 1960); Harvey Mach. Co. v. J.
0. Ross Eng. Corp., 54 Cal. 2d .... 353 P.2d 928, 6 Cal. Rptr. 288, affirming 1 Cal.
Rptr. 869 (D.C.A. Cal. 1960); Vinnell Co. v. Pac. Elec. By. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 411, 340
P.2d 604 (1959).
96 Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 (D.C.A. Cal.
1960).
07 George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal. 2d 834, 205 P.2d 1037 (1949).
Where the transaction is in interstate commerce it is regulated by federal law. See, e.g.,
Glickfeld v. Howard Van Lines, 213 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1954).
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Most of the cases that have passed upon exculpatory clauses have
involved leases. The principles established there should apply with
equal force to other types of contracts.
The sole purpose in life of an exculpatory clause in the form of an
exemption provision is to save the exculpatee from liability for his
wrongful conduct and that of agents and employees for whose conduct
he is responsible. If such an exculpatory clause fails in this, it fails
totally.
An exculpatory clause in the form of an indemnity or hold harmless
clause is another thing. (While such clauses are discussed in a case
study which follows this article, they must be discussed to some extent
here.) Hold harmless clauses are customarily couched in broad language
to the effect that "second party will hold and save first party harmless
from all claims." The purpose of a hold harmless clause is to save the
exculpatee from the claims of third persons.
Conflict of Policies
Exculpatory clauses create a problem because there is some amount
of immorality in attempting to contract away liability for negligence.
Is there enough to cause the law to forbid such clauses? Many courts
so hold.9 But the policy of the law against immoral contracts collides
with the policy of freedom of contract, as did the anti-forfeiture policy
to some extent, and many jurisdictions strike a compromise by permit-
ting exculpation but drawing the line at aggravated negligence. This
is the position of the Restatement of Contracts which permits one to
contract away liability for any but gross negligence. 9
Such a collision occurred in California. In the first instance the
California law leaned strongly toward freedom of contract. In 1872
the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 1668 100 which seems, but
has not been held, to permit broadly of exculpatory clauses and to per-
mit exculpation from all but intentional wrongs. And the foundation
case of Stephens v. Southern Pacific Co.'0' gave such clauses broad
approval.
At this point an attorney would have composed an exemption
clause to the effect that "first party shall not be liable for any injury
98 38 AM. JuR. NEGLIGENCE, § 8, p. 649.
99 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 574, 575, approved in Werner v. Knoll, 89 Cal.
App. 2d 474, 201 P.2d 45 (1948); Nichols v. Hitchcock Motor Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d
121, 70 P.2d 654 (1937).
100 CAL. CiV. CODE § 1668: "All contracts which have for their object, directly or
indirectly, to exempt any one from responsibility for his own fraud or wilful injury to
the person or property of another, or violations of law, whether wilful or negligent, are
against the policy of the law."
101 109 Cal. 86, 41 Pac. 783 (1895).
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or damage to the person or property of second party from any cause
whatsoever," and would have commended himself on having done a
maximum job with a minimum of words. If he had doubt, it would
have been whether the words "from any cause whatsoever" were nec-
essary. And so it would have gone for a time.
In time the attitude of the California courts underwent drastic
change. What it became and is is well summed up in Basin Oil Co. v.
Baash-Ross Tool Co.,10 2 where it is said that "the law does not look
with favor upon attempts to avoid liability or secure exemption for
one's own negligence, and such provisions are strictly construed against
the person relying on them."
The only way in which this new attitude could be implemented was
by the process of construction suggested in the Basin Oil Co. case.
Even if the Stephens case were to be overruled, which certainly it
never will be because of the ease with which it can be circumvented,
section 1668 remained, and in the final analysis it must permit excul-
pation to some substantial extent.
Principles of Construction
Two principles of construction have been resorted to. One, an in-
strument is to be construed against its author; all doubts are to be
resolved against him. This is available where the exculpatee is the
draftsman of the exculpatory clause. Two, despite broad, all inclusive
language, exculpatory clauses are to be read in the light of the ap-
parent intention of the parties.
These principles of construction have permitted the courts, among
other things, to find that the ordinary hold harmless clause is not in-
tended to protect the indemnitee against negligent injury to the indem-
nitor, and that an exemption clause in general terms is not intended
to exempt the exculpatee from liability for affirmative negligence to-
ward the exculpator.
This is where the California law stands. By having continued to
draft exculpatory clauses which do not remedy such defects, draftsmen
have saved the courts from having to decide important questions that
remain to be decided. The writer might add that, in the course of pre-
paring this article, he has examined a variety of printed forms of leases,
equipment rental contracts and bailment contracts in current use and
in no case has found a trustworthy exculpatory clause.
B. Case Law
California case law starts with Stephens v. Southern Pacific Co. 10 3
Defendant's worlanan negligently set fire to a warehouse of plaintiff
102 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 594, 271 P.2d 122 (1954).
103 Supra note 101. In a companion case of King v. Southern Pacific Co., 109 Cal.
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located on land leased by plaintiff to defendant. An exemption clause
in the lease provided that defendant "shall not be responsible for any
damage caused by fire ... caused from any ... means .... ." Plaintiff
argued that the provision was against public policy because it would
have a tendency to lessen the care that defendant would use in con-
trolling fire which in turn would increase the risk to the public of con-
flagrations. The court held for defendant. This was a time when the
doctrine of freedom of contract ran strong, and the case was decided
in favor of that principle. The court announced it immediately: "While
contracts opposed to morality or law should not be allowed to show
themselves in courts of justice, yet public policy requires and encour-
ages... contracts... upon all lawful and valid considerations." Private
individuals, it continued, should be allowed wide latitude in contract-
ing and courts should be slow to interfere, particularly with such an
"unruly horse" as public policy, which ought to be let out of the barn
only in clear cases. As between plaintiff and defendant, it concluded,
"there can be no question as to the validity of the contract" and it could
be invalid only if it offended public policy. This it could not do, rea-
soned the court, because public policy can be invoked only when the
public interest is involved, when the public stands to be endangered.
Such would not be the case here since the exemption clause would not
vary defendant's obligations to the public.
The Stephens case is said to stand for the proposition that one may
exempt himself from liability for negligence so long as the public in-
terest is not involved.10 4 In no case has the public interest exception
of the Stephens case been invoked, and the exception seems more
fancied than real.
Inglis v. Garland 105 marked the introduction but is not a signifi-
cant application of the doctrine of strict construction. Water damage
resulted from leakage which defendant-lessor had made honest but
inept efforts to trace, on which account he was guilty of negligence.
Defendant relied on a hold harmless clause and a covenant not to sue.
The hold harmless clause read: "Tenant agrees .. .to save the Land-
lord harmless and indemnified from all loss, damage, liability or expense
incurred or claimed by reason of Tenant's neglect or use of the premises
... or by reason of any injury or damage to any person or property
96, 41 Pac. 786 (1895), it was held that a third person who had deposited goods in the
plaintiff's warehouse was not barred by the exemption clause though he knew of it when
he made his deposit. In the Stephens case, at 93-94, it is said that one ought to be able,
by exculpatory clause, to exempt himself from the strict liability that attaches to ultra-
hazardous activities such as blasting.
104 Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d 122
(1954).
105 19 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 767, 64 P.2d 501 (1936).
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therein." The covenant not to sue read: "Tenant agrees that Tenant
will not.., make any claim against Landlord for any injury, loss or
damage to person or property occurring therein from any cause." The
court said of the hold harmless clause that it was to be strictly con-
strued; 06 that it was fairly to be construed as an agreement to indem-
nify defendant against claims of third persons arising out of negligence
of plaintiff and could not upon any reasonable construction be consid-
ered as operating to release defendant of liability for his negligence
toward tenant. The covenant not to sue was a different story. It, said
the court, must be taken to be a good defense unless the ".... language
... [is to] ... be deemed not ... to include injury caused by defendant's
negligence" or "the agreement... [must] ... be held void as contrary
to public policy. We think neither proviso can be sustained." The court
relied on the Stephens case as its authority for the legality of such an
agreement.
With regard to the covenant not to sue, the court adopted from
a Pennsylvania opinion 1 07 this statement, which is of interest because
it states the premise upon which the attorney is apt to build and, as it
turns out, is the one premise upon which the California attorney cannot
build: "'The lease provides that the landlord shall be released "from
all liability for any and all damage caused by water." The terms are
emphatic-the word "all" needs no definition; it includes everything
and excludes nothing. There is no more comprehensive word in the
language, and as used here it is obviously broad enough to cover lia-
bility for negligence. If it had been the intention of the parties to ex-
clude negligent acts, they would have so written the agreement.'
The Inglis case may be an important one, the importance of which
has been overlooked. Its covenant not to sue stood up, as has been
seen. In the cases that follow, the exemption clauses will be simple
exemption clauses, "A shall not be liable to B on any account," as dis-
tinguished from the covenant not to sue, "B agrees not to sue A on any
account." We will see the simple exemption clause fail for failure ex-
pressly to include negligence, that is, for failure to say, "A shall not be
liable to B on any account, including injury or damage to the person
or property of B caused by negligence of A." While this renders mean-
ingless the first part of the clause ("A shall not be liable to B on any
account . . ."), this is the process of strict construction. If the same
process were applied to the covenant not to sue, it would say that A
would not escape negligence liability to B unless the covenant read,
"B agrees not to sue A on any account, including causes of actions
106 Id. at 770.
107 Cannon v. Bresch, 307 Pa. 31, 160 At. 595 (1932).
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arising out of injuries to the person or property of B resulting from
negligence of A." It would seem to be more difficult to make this re-
quirement of a covenant not to sue than of an exemption clause. It is
justified in the case of the simple exemption clause on the ground that
the parties would not intend to include the negligence of the one party
unless this was spelled out. It is much more difficult to say that there is
no intent to include causes of action based on negligence unless spelled
out. The covenant not to sue therefore may be a more trustworthy
exculpating device than the exemption clause, and, in the discussion of
drafting, infra, the writer recommends its inclusion in all cases. 108
Werner v. Knoll '0 9 was the first case to take note of Civil Code
section 1668.110 A father sued for the wrongful death of his son who
was killed while operating a tractor on land leased by defendant to the
father. The tractor, which was owned by defendant, had a latent de-
fect. Relying on the Stephens and Inglis cases the court upheld an
exemption clause which read: "First party [defendant] shall not be
liable for any damage arising from personal injuries sustained by any
person or persons, in, on, or about said premises, from any cause what-
soever....
To the argument that the exemption clause violated section 1668
the court replied: "Clearly said section 1668 does not declare unlawful
all contracts, the object of which is to exempt individuals from the con-
sequences of their own acts, but only those contracts which would
exempt one from the consequences of his own fraud, wilful injury or
violation of law whether wilful or negligent. It is noteworthy that the
only use of the word negligent in said section is in a restrictive sense
and only in connection with violations of law. Therefore it necessarily
follows, that by the obvious omission from the provisions of said sec-
tion 1668 of the Civil Code, contracts seeking to relieve individuals
from the results of their own negligence are not invalid as against the
policy of the law as therein provided ... "111
Plaintiff also argued that since the exemption clause undertook to
relieve defendant of liability "from any cause," it attempted to relieve
him of liability for fraud and wilful injury as prohibited by 1668. The
court said that even if this were so the illegal portion of the contract
would be severable.
108 Cf. Butt v. Bertola, 110 Cal. App. 2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952).
109 89 Cal. App. 2d 474, 201 P.2d 45 (1948).
110 Supra note 100.
111 Werner v. Knoll, supra note 109, at 476.
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Affirmative Negligence Cases
Butt v. Bertola 112 and Barkett v. Brucato 113 may be called the af-
firmative negligence cases. They propounded the theory that an exemp-
tion clause could not be taken to be intended to exempt the exculpatee
from the consequences of his affirmative negligence unless this was
spelled out. This marks the first appearance of the term affirmative
negligence in the California cases. 114 It appears that such negligence
is present when the wrongdoer increases the probability of injury by
extended inaction with knowledge of the danger, or by doing an act
under such circumstances as to render it ultra-hazardous. It is said in
the Butt case, that it comes very close to being wilful misconduct, for ex-
emption from the consequences of which a person may not contract.1 5
Butt v. Bertola involved this: For a long period of time, despite
frequent request from plaintiff-lessee, defandant-lessor failed to repair
defective plumbing in another part of his building. This caused leakage
into and ultimately resulted in a flooding of the portion of the premises
which plaintiff occupied as a restaurant. At this point, with his lease
having eight months to run, plaintiff claimed an eviction, vacated the
premises, and brought an action for lost profits and damage to stock
and equipment. The defense was an exemption clause in the lease,
which provided: "It is agreed by the parties hereto, that said Lessor
shall not be liable for damages to any goods, property, or effects in or
upon said demised premises, caused by gas, water, or other fluid from
any source whatsoever."
As another lesson in the care with which exculpatory clauses must
be drawn, the court first ruled that since there was no exemption from
liability for lost profits, they were recoverable. 1 0
The court then went on to find that the clause was not good against
property damage, reasoning that despite broad, all inclusive language,
exculpatory clauses are to be read in the light of the apparent intention
of the parties. Here there was "at the very least, active or affirmative
negligence, not mere ordinary negligence." Also the conduct involved
constituted a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Under these
circumstances "... [it] cannot, without more explicit and specific words
in this clause, ... [be] conclude [d] that the minds of the parties met and
112 110 Cal. App. 2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952).
113 122 Cal. App. 2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 (1953).
114 The term is not an invention of the California courts. See Annots., 175 A.L.R. 8,
26 A.L.R. 2d 1044, 1055.
115 Butt v. Bertola, supra note 112, at 138.
1"6 Butt v. Bertola, supra note 112, at 134. Plaintiff was awarded $2,666.66 for lost
profits on the ground that his average annual profit was $4,000 and that he had lost 8/12
of his last year's profits.
Nov., 1960]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
agreed to exempt the defendants from the consequences of their own
wrongful acts when of the kind and nature of those here involved.'' 1
The Inglis and Werner cases were distinguished as passive negli-
gence cases. This is justified as to the Inglis case. Without more infor-
mation than is provided by the report, it is not justified as to the Werner
case. If, there, for example, the defect in the tractor was one which
would have been especially likely to cause accident, there would have
been aggravated negligence. If not affirmative negligence it would have
been more than passive negligence.118
In Barkett v. Brucato,1" 9 the negligence consisted of removal of the
roof of the lessee's flat during the rainy season when not required by
any emergency; tied in as an aggravating circumstance was the fact
that defendant was acting maliciously, this being one of a long series
of acts designed to get plaintiff to move.
The Barkett case discloses what may be still another trap for the
unwary draftsman. Recovery was sought for impairment of health and
emotional disturbance, and there is implication that exemption from
"injury to any person" would not embrace these things. Seemingly the
draftsman must declare exemption from damages resulting from im-
pairment of health and injuries, mental, physical, or emotional.
The Barkett case is noteworthy in one other respect. It is the only
case other than the Werner case 120 that has undertaken to analyze
Civil Code section 1668.121 It says: "The Werner case interpreted that
section as invalidating contracts that purported to exempt one for the
consequences of his fraud, or wilful acts, or acts in violation of the law
whether wilful or negligent, and then held that the word 'negligent'
modified only 'violation of law.' Were the question one of first impres-
sion this interpretation might be questioned. The section provides that
any contract purporting to exempt one from responsibility for 'his own
fraud,' 'wilful injury to the person or property of another,' and 'viola-
tion of law' are 'against the policy of the law.' The phrase 'whether
wilful or negligent' is found after this enumeration, and is set off from
the three-fold enumeration by commas. It is a possible interpretation
to hold that the 'wilful or negligent' clause modifies all three of the
prior clauses, and is not limited to a 'violation of law.' Specifically, the
section could mean that it is illegal to attempt to contract away any
117 Butt v. Bertola, supra note 112, at 138.
118 In Fields v. City of Oakland, 137 Cal. App. 602, 291 P.2d 145 (1955), it is
said by way of dictum that an exculpatory clause may exempt the exculpatee from liabil-
ity for affirmative negligence if this is spelled out, citing the Stephens and Werner cases
as authority.
119 Supra note 113.
120 See discussion at p. 146 supra.
121 Supra note 100.
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liability for acts caused by wilful injury to the person or property of
another... whether wilful or negligent.' This would be one way of
expressing, somewhat awkwardly, the distinction between 'wilful,' that
is, active, positive, or affirmative negligence, and passive negligence."122
The Vinnell Case
Vinnell Co. v. Pac. Elec. Ry. Co.,' 2 3 a recent California Supreme
Court decision, may or may not be the most important case since Ste-
phens v. Southern Pacific Co.12 4 This depends on what, in later cases,
the court determines the Vinnell case to stand for.
In the Vinnell case defendant gave the city of Los Angeles an ease-
ment to construct a storm drain on defendant's property which the
city undertook to do through plaintiff contractor. Defendant negli-
gently ran a locomotive into the drain when partially completed. The
easement contained this exculpatory clause: "Contractor hereby re-
leases and agrees to indemnify and save Railroad harmless from and
against any and all injuries to and deaths of persons, claims, demands,
cost, loss, damage and liability, howsoever same may be caused, result-
ing directly or indirectly from the performance of any or all work to
be done upon the property and beneath the tracks of Railroad and
upon the premises adjacent thereto under said agreement between Dis-
trict and Contractor, also from all injuries to and deaths of persons,
claims, demands, cost, loss, damage and liability, howsoever same may
be caused either directly or indirectly, made or suffered by said Con-
tractor, Contractor's agents, employes and subcontractors, and the
agents and employees of such subcontractors, while engaged in the
performance of said work."
"The question is," said the court, "whether such an indemnity
clause operates to exculpate the defendant from the consequences of
its own negligence where the clause does not expressly state that dam-
age caused by the defendant's negligence is intended to be included
in the coverage of the clause." (Emphasis added.)
The court immediately answered with the broad statement that
"'to be sufficient as an exculpatory provision against one's own negli-
gence, the party seeking to rely thereon must select words or terms
clearly and explicitly expressing that this was the intent of the parties.'
(Sproul v. Cuddy, 131 Cal. App. 2d 85, 95, 280 P.2d 158.) The lan-
guage of the present clause, prepared on behalf of the defendant rail-
road, falls short of so expressing the defendant's intention to exculpate
'2 2 Barkett v. Brucato, supra note 113, at 277.
23 52 Cal. 2d 411, 340 P.2d 604 (1959). See also Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzell &
Buehler, supra note 95; Harvey Machine Co. v. J. 0. Ross Eng. Corp., supra note 95.
124 Supra note 101.
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itself." (Emphasis added.) The court added the companion rule of con-
struction, applicable here, that an exculpatory clause is to be construed
against its author.
In the closing paragraph of the opinion the court said that "both
by precedent and good reason, if an indemnitor such as the plaintiff is
to be made responsible for the negligent act of an indemnitee over
whose conduct it has no control, the language imposing such liability
should do so expressly and unequivocally so that the contracting party
is advised in definite terms of the liability to which it is exposed. The
indemnification clause in the present case, by not expressly stating that
the defendant was protected against acts of its own negligence, failed
to meet this requirement." (Emphasis added.)
The difficulty with the case lies in the words that have been empha-
sized. If the court is treating the exculpatory provision purely as a hold
harmless clause, the case adds nothing to what was decided in Inglis
v. Garland. Because of its purpose, it can easily enough be said that
the hold harmless clause does not cover the indemnitee's negligence
toward the indemnitor unless expressed, as the Inglis case held.
The clause is however a combination hold harmless and exemption
clause, being the latter to the extent of the words "Contractor hereby re-
leases ... Railroad... from.., all... claims.. . ." It may be therefore
that the court intends its broad statement regarding express inclusion
of the exculpatee's negligence to apply to exemption clauses. Only
the court can answer the question.
The case relied on by the court, Sproul v Cuddy,125 is of no help
since it too involves a combination hold harmless-exemption clause.
Defendant made two arguments in the Vinnell case that may be
noted. It argued that the exculpatory clause would be meaningless if
it did not exempt it from liability for negligence. The court disposed of
this by saying that it would protect defendant against claims of third
persons and that it would also protect defendant against the "cost" of
litigation. It also made the argument, with which it had been successful
in the district court of appeal,12 6 that since the easement was gratu-
itous the exculpatory clause ought to be liberally construed as that
would be the intent of parties in such circumstances. The court's an-
swer was that it was not a case of whether defendant ought to be pro-
tected but of whether the clause conferred protection.
If the Vinnell case is determined to stand for the proposition that
an exemption clause must expressly include the exculpatee's negligence
125 131 Cal. App. 2d 85, 280 P.2d 158 (1955).
12-" Vinnell Co. v. Pac. Elec. Ry. Co., 334 P.2d 139 (D.C.A. Cal. 1959), vacated.
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it would displace the Butt and Barkett cases except where the clause
spoke only of "negligence" and there was affirmative negligence.
Miscellaneous Cases
These miscellaneous cases and areas of exculpation are notewor-
thy. 27
In Oakland v. Oakland School Dist.,1'28 a hold harmless clause was
held not to extend to injuries occurring on approaches to premises
where the lease described only the premises proper.
Simmons v. Bank of America 129 presents an exculpatory clause in
an escrow agreement. Defendant bank as escrow failed to record a
chattel mortgage given by the buyer of a business so that it was not a
lien when the buyer became bankrupt. The escrow agreement con-
tained this provision which was held to provide a good defense on the
ground that only ordinary negligence was involved: "In consideration
of your acting as escrow holder herein, it is agreed that you shall in
no case or event be liable for the failure of any of the conditions of this
escrow or damage caused by the exercise of your discretion in any par-
ticular manner, or for any other reason, except gross negligence or
wilful misconduct with reference to the said escrow ......
In Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-Ross Tool Co.,130 defendant manufac-
tured oil well equipment for plaintiff which, because of defects result-
ing from negligent manufacture, damaged plaintiff's wells. Defendant's
invoice provided in part: "... under no circumstances are we respon-
sible for any damages beyond the price of the goods. No damages or
127 Another miscellaneous area is the parking lot bailment. Parking lots which oper-
ate as bailees regularly attempt, by signs and provisions in tickets, to exempt themselves
from liability for bailed automobiles. It is always a preliminary question whether a park-
ing lot transaction is a lease or a bailment. See BnoWN, PERsoNAL PRoPERTY § 75, p. 238;
Thompson v. Mobile Light & R. Co., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177, 34 A.L.R. 921 (1924).
If the transaction can be framed as a lease of real property, the lot operator has no
responsibility for cars. There is only one California case in this area, U Drive etc. v. Sys-
tem Auto Parks, 28 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 782, 71 P.2d 354 (1937), and it was a case of
fixing the defines of the bailment contract rather than of limiting liability. CAL. Cr.
CODE § 1630 infers that a parking lot operator may exempt himself from liability. Nichols
v. Hitchcock Motor Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 121, 70 P.2d 654 (1937), may be noted here.
It held that risk of loss was on the car owner where he agreed, in his purchase contract,
to "assume full responsibility" while his car was being operated by an employee of the
dealer for the purpose of being serviced during the warranty period. Since the case con-
troverts the strict construction rule, it is regularly cited by those who would avoid that
rule. The strict construction cases then either ignore its implications or "distinguish" it,
as did Sproul v. Cuddy, 131 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d 122 (1954), where it was said
that the Nichols case is readily distinguishable by virtue of the difference in the exculpa-
tory language used.
128 141 Cal. App. 2d 733, 297 P.2d 752 (1956).
129 159 Cal. App. 2d 566, 323 P.2d 1043 (1958).
130 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d 122 (1954).
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charges of any kind, either for labor, expenses or otherwise, suffered or
incurred by the customer in repairing or replacing defective goods, or
occasioned by them will be allowed." The court said, conceding for the
sake of argument that the provision became part of the contract for
the sale of the equipment, it could be construed as a mere disclaimer
of warranty rather than as an exemption from liability for negligence.
Sproul v. Cuddy,131 which accords with Basin Oil and which was
relied upon by the Vinnell case, involved equipment rental. There a
disclaimer provision was not effective to exclude negligence liability or
the warranty of safety and suitability that is deemed to be made by a
bailor in a bailment for hire.
Disclaimers of Warranty
This brings us to disclaimers of warranty. These are the exculpatory
clauses of sales of goods. They are also necessary to escape liability on
the warranty of fitness and safety made by the lessor or bailor for hire
of personalty.
California case law on disclaimers is fragmentary but is clearly in
the pattern of the general law.132 The problem is the same as in the
case of exculpatory clauses. Disclaimers thwart the law's efforts to pro-
tect the public, therefore they are construed strictly.1 33
A preliminary problem is whether the disclaimer has become part
of the transaction. The seller, caught between not wanting to disparage
his product and not wanting to insure, attempts to inject the disclaimer
in some innocuous way. He inserts it in fine print in his invoice or on
the back of his purchase order form or in his label. This may permit the
court to say that the disclaimer never became part of the contract or
at least that it does not overcome anterior warranties resulting from
oral or written representations.1 34
The elementary application of the doctrine of strict construction is
to say that general disclaimer clauses such as that "no warranties are
made in connection with sale" exclude only express warranties.1 3
131 131 Cal. App. 2d 85, 280 P.2d 158 (1955).
132 See generally Wilson, Products Liability, Part Il-The Protection of the Produc-
ing Enterprise, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 809 (1955); VOLD, SALES, 444-447 (2d ed. 1959).
133 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
134 India Paint Co. v. United Steel Prod. Corp., 123 Cal. App. 2d 597, 267 P.2d 408
(1954) (oral guarantee not overcome by disclaimer in shipping ticket).
135 U. S. Credit Bureau v. Powell, 121 Cal App. 2d Supp. 870, 264 P.2d 229 (1953).
For cases of effective broad form disclaimers see Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Lea, 198 F.2d
1012 (6th Cir. 1952) ("The above guarantee is in lieu of and excludes all other guaran-
ties, warranties, obligations or promises, express or implied, by contract or by law .... ");
L'Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd. [1934] 2 K.B. 394 (exclusion of "any express or implied
condition, statement or warranty, statutory or otherwise, not stated herein .... ").
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Professor Vold points out that, while the Uniform Sales Act speaks
only of express warranties and implied warranties, there are, concep-
tually, three kinds of warranties: promissory or contractual warranties
such as are made by the automobile and appliance manufacturer;
18 6
warranties imposed by law because of representations of fact made by
the seller; 3 7 and warranties imposed by law without regard to the
intent of the parties, the implied warranties of merchantability and
suitability. 8 This being so, a general disclaimer clause ("no warran-
ties are made in connection with this sale") could be construed to
exclude only promissory warranties and not warranties imposed by
law because of representations of fact or implied warranties.
139
A more refined application of the doctrine of strict construction is
found in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.' 40 The label on insecticide
listed its contents and recited that "seller makes no warranty of any
kind, express or implied, concerning the use of this product." The in-
secticide, purchased for the purpose spraying cotton plants, contained
a small amount of a chemical which was harmful to cotton plants but
not to other plants.
It was held that, by expressly negativing any warranty concerning
"use," the disclaimer excluded the implied warranty of suitability.14'
But the warranty of merchantability ' 42 was applicable, said the court.
Its rationale involves a difficulty however. It says that the warranty of
merchantability requires goods to conform to description so as to be
salable and usable for the general purposes of goods of the kind de-
scribed; that since the description (list of contents on label) did not
show the injurious chemical, the goods did not meet their description
and therefore were not salable and usable for the general purposes of
goods of the kind described. But the insecticide was satisfactory for
everything but cotton plants, a particular purpose.
Where an article is incapable of doing what it was purchased to
do, a concrete manufacturing machine which is not capable of manu-
facturing concrete blocks, there is not merely breach of warranty but
failure of consideration which results in breach of contract and which
permits recovery despite a disclaimer clause.
143
In a proper case, sales of used goods, clearance sales, and other
136 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1732.
137 Ibid.
38 CAL. Crv. CODE § 1735(1)(2).
130 VOLD, SALES, 444-445 (2d Ed. 1959).
14042 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
141 CAL. CiV. CODE §1735(1).
142 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1735(2).
143 Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1951).
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sales under special circumstances, warranties going to freedom from
defects will be effectively disclaimed by sale "as is." 144
Disclaimers may be rendered void by statute or decision. 4 5 In this
connection two provisions of the recently adopted Unruh Act 146 may
raise questions in California. Civil Code section 1804.1 provides:
No contract or obligation shall contain any provision by which:
(a) The buyer agrees not to assert against a seller or an assignee a
claim or defense arising out of the sale.... (g) The buyer relieves
the seller from liability for any legal remedies which the buyer may
have against the seller under the contract or any separate instru-
ment executed in connection therewith.
The first, 1804.1 (a), is no doubt primarily aimed at stock provisions
in conditional sales contracts to the effect that "purchaser waives as
against any assignee of the seller any defenses, set-offs or counterclaims
purchaser may be entitled to assert against seller." Such provisions at-
tempt to confer negotiability upon conditional sales contracts, that is,
to put the assignee of such a contract in the position of a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument. The second, 1804.1 (g), appears to be
aimed at waivers of provisions of the Act which are designed to protect
a buyer such as the provision for right of redemption. 147 Either, how-
ever, is capable of being made the basis of an argument that disclaimers
of warranty are not permitted in connection with the types of sales
covered by the Act. But to so hold would produce the anomaly that
warranty liability could not be disclaimed in credit sales but could in
cash sales. Additionally, it would result in conflict with Civil Code sec-
tion 1791, which permits disclaimers of warranty, bringing to bear the
rule of statutory construction that where there is room for application
of each of two statutes, they are to be construed so as to make each
operative. The Unruh Act sections can be applied as suggested, and,
so far as "claim(s) ... arising out of the sale" is concerned, it can be
said that this refers to claims for damages given the buyer for various
violations of the Act.
148
There are decisions in other jurisdictions permitting negligence as
well as warranty liability to be disclaimed in connection with sales of
goods and allowing this to be done by general language such as that
"(b)uyer assumes all risk and liability whatsoever resulting from the
144 Roberts Distributing Co. v. Kaye-Halbert Corp., 126 Cal. App. 2d 664, 272 P.2d
886 (1954).
145 VOLD, SALES, 447 (2d ed. 1959). Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169
Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.C. 1939) (disclaimer as to food against pub-
lic policy. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.318.
146 See p. 140 supra.
147 Supra note 92.
148 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1812.7, 1812.9.
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use of such materials." 149 In California, in view of the cases heretofore
reviewed, it would appear that express inclusion of the seller's negli-
gence, and of his affirmative negligence, would be necessary to effect
such disclaimer.
A lessor or bailor for hire of equipment such as trailers has the duty
to use reasonable care to examine the chattel to make certain it is safe
and suitable for its intended purpose. 150 This can be placed on a war-
ranty basis under Civil Code section 1955 151 or by adoption of the
common law rule to such effect. 52 While liability for breach of this
duty can be disclaimed, the rule of strict construction may be expected
to be applied.15 The duty has been extended to business visitors on
the bailee's premises so that a hold harmless clause should be included
in the rental contract. 54
C. Drafting Exculpatory Clauses
We have seen seen woods filled with traps for exculpatory clauses.
In the case of exemption clauses at least it is clear that they "'must be
spelled out with infinite clarity.""-55 Whether it is otherwise with cov-
enants not to sue remains to be seen. Until that time the attorney can
do justice to his client only by including an exculpatory clause which
attempts to cover everything, expressly.
By way of checking the sufficiency of his clause the draftsman
must ask:
1. Does it specifically cover negligence of my client?
2. Does it specifically cover affirmative negligence of my client?
While the greater generally includes the lesser, that principle may not
be relied on here. Until the matter is passed upon it is not known
whether one may exempt himself from liability for affirmative negli-
gence. 15 Were it determined that one could not, and if an exemp-
tion clause covering only "affirmative negligence" were then to come
before a court in a case involving a lesser degree of negligence, it could
be held to cover only affirmative negligence, not the lesser degree.
Therefore, drafting should be in terms of "negligence, including affirm-
149 Charles Lachman Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 79 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Penna.
1948); Wilson, Products Liability, Part I-The Protection of the Producing Enterprise,
43 CALwi. L. REv. 809 (1955).
150 McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 2d 740, 255 P.2d 810 (1953); Tierstein v. Licht,
174 Cal. App. 2d 835, 345 P.2d 341 (1959).
151 Tierstein v. Licht, supra note 150.
152 McNeal v. Greenberg, supra note 150.
153 Sproul v. Cuddy, supra note 131.
1
5 4 Tierstein v. Licht, supra note 150.
155 Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, supra note 96.
15 6 See note 118, supra.
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ative negligence." Then if it is determined that one may .not contract
away liability for affirmative negligence, this illegal part of the provi-
sion may be severed.
3. Does it specifically cover all possibilities of injury and damage:
mental and emotional disturbance, impairment of health, loss of profits,
injury to good will, damage to forms of property such as books of
account?
4. Does it specifically cover all areas in which injury or damage
may occur: areas surrounding leased premises, approaches, entrances
and exits, and areas under the control of a landlord, such as stairways,
elevators, laundry areas, parking areas and recreation areas? 
5 7
Until the California law becomes much better settled than it is,
an attorney seeking exculpation for his client should include in the
contract an exemption clause and a covenant not to sue and a hold
harmless clause. The second may be good where the first is not,158 and
the hold harmless clause serves the distinct purpose of shifting to the
promisor liability which the promisee may incur to third persons.
It would seem that an adequate exemption clause in a lease would
have to be a monstrosity such as this:
Lessor shall not be liable for any injury or damage to any person or
property including the person or property of the lessee, or for any loss
of or injury to earnings, profits, or good will suffered by any person,
including the lessee, regardless of how the same may be caused or suf-
fered and though the same may be caused or suffered by reason of
breach of this lease or negligence, affirmative or otherwise, on the part
of the lessor, his agents, employees, or independent contractors, or per-
sons acting under his direction or control, or at his request, or with
his permission or authority, and though the same may be caused or
occur in, on, or about portions of the leased premises which are under
the control of the lessor, though the lessee may be entitled to use the
same, or be caused or occur in, on, or about areas adjoining or abutting
the leased premises, or leading thereto or therefrom, or in any manner
connected therewith, though the lessee may be entitled to use the same.
"Injuries" as used herein shall include but in no wise be limited to acts
or omissions which cause or result in an impairment of the health of
any person, including the lessee, or which cause mental or emotional
distress or disturbance of any kind to any person, including the lessee.
"Property" as used herein shall include but in no wise be limited to
157 See Freeman v. Mazzera, 150 Cal. App. 2d 61, 309 P.2d 510 (1957) (landing
on which children played); Harper v. Vallejo Housing Authority, 104 Cal. App. 2d 621,
232 P.2d 262 (1951) (recreation area); Turner v. Lischner, 52 Cal. App. 2d 273, 126
P.2d 156 (1942) (clothes drying area).
158 See discussion p. 145 supra.
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books of accounts, records, documents, instruments, papers, and intan-
gible forms of property of all kinds. None of the provisions hereof shall
be deemed to be in conflict in any manner with any of the provisions
of paragraph - of this lease (paragraph containing covenant of quiet
enjoyment). It is the purpose and intent of the parties hereto to save
and relieve the lessor of liability to the lessee to the fullest extent per-
mitted by law, and it is the intention and agreement of the parties
hereto that the terms and provisions of this paragraph shall be liberally
construed in favor of the lessor and shall be construed in such manner
as to carry out such purpose, intent, and agreement.
In contracts other than leases in which exculpation is desired the
foregoing would be watered down to suit the occasion with the drafts-
man always keeping in mind to expressly include in the exculpatory
clause the "negligence, including affirmative negligence," of the ex-
culpatee.
